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ABSTRACT

Design, Implementation and Analysis of a Dynamic Cryptography Algorithm
with Applications
by
Sourabh Ghose
Dr. Yoohwan Kim, Examination Committee Chair
Assistant Professor of Computer Science Department
University o f Nevada, Las Vegas

Cryptographers need to provide the world with a new encryption standard. DES,
the major encryption algorithm for the past fifteen years, is nearing the end o f its useful
life. Its 56-bit key size is vulnerable to a brute-force attack on powerful microprocessors
and recent advances in linear cryptanalysis and differential cryptanalysis indicate that
DES is vulnerable to other attacks as well. A more recent attack called XSL, proposes a
new attack against AES and Serpent. The attaek depends much more critieally on the
complexity o f the nonlinear components than on the number o f rounds. Ciphers with
small S-boxes and simple structures are particularly vulnerable. Serpent has small Sboxes and a simple structure. AES has larger S-boxes, but a very simple algebraic
description. If the attack is proven to be correct, cryptographers predict it to break AES
with a 2^80 complexity, over the coming years.
Many o f the other unbroken algorithms -K hufu, REDOC II, and IDEA-are
protected by patents. RC2 is broken. The U.S. government has declassified the Skipjaek
algorithm in the Clipper and Capstone chips.

iii
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If the world is to have a secure, unpatented, and freely- available encryption
algorithm, we need to develop several candidate encryption algorithms now. These
algorithms can then be subjected to years o f public scrutiny and cryptanalysis. The
purpose o f the thesis is to discuss the requirements for a standard encryption algorithm.
DCA (Dynamic Cryptography Algorithm), a new private-key block cipher, is
proposed. The block size is user defined, and the key can be o f infinite length. The
algorithm is a first o f its kind dynamic algorithm in which almost all components change
depending o f the password itself used to generate a key or encrypt a file. The “Key
dependency” has been pushed to the extreme with dynamically linked eomponents like
number o f rounds, operation used on each bits, shift window, direction o f each operation
(Left or Right), size o f the key buffer when encrypting a file, size o f the block shuffle and
working file block.
The aetual encryption o f data is performed in two modules. Key generation and
File encryption and is very efficient on all microprocessors. Key generation is a complex
procedure o f Key Padding, Concatenating bits, initial scrambling, key encryption and
final scrambling. File encryption consists o f complex steps o f initialization, seeding and
shuffling. All default settings can also be changed by the user, which means the
knowledge required to decrypt/reproduce a key gets extended to the environment settings
as well as the password itself.

IV
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION
Privacy is a sensitive subject that affects everyone. Common techniques to safe
guard privacy are:
- When writing a confidential letter an envelope is used to send it.
- When using a credit card a secret code number is used.
- Speaking to someone in private.
In case o f computers, sensitive data is common (e.g. assessment grades, financial
accounts, etc). With the Internet, the computer can be used like a telephone or like a post
office, with the disadvantage that everybody connected to the network could have access
to the data. This is why, especially with computers, privacy is important. Different levels
of security (computer security, network security, etc) have to be considered.
Cryptography can be compared to an electronic safe where private data is hidden.
The cryptographer must always think about the intruder. Cryptography can be compared
to a chess game, in that we must think not only o f our own tactics, but also o f our
opponents. Cryptography usually uses a lot o f mathematieal formulae and logieal
functions. The science is quite new for the public, this is why it is a very difficult subject,
but now more people are interested in it and a lot o f book dealing with the subject have
been written and it is now easy to find good cryptography information. It seems that the
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strongest cryptography algorithms are now available to the public even if it is very
difficult to understand them. Indeed, the best way to know if a cryptography algorithm is
strong is to make its source code and documentation available to the public. If no one can
break it then it is safe to use it.

l.I Terminology
To make the thesis easier to understand, here are definitions of terms used in the text.
Clear text: An understandable message, usually the original.
Cipher text: An incomprehensible message, usually the result.
Password: A secret string of characters.
Encrypt: Transform a clear text into a cipher text, usually with a password.
Decrypt: Transform a cipher text into a clear text, usually with a password.
Key: Some data that will be used into the message encrypt process. It can also be used
like a password, the difference is in this case that it is a long string of characters and
numbers one cannot remember as is very long and complex. A key could be compared to
a cipher password.
Private Key: This key is personal and only known by one person.
Public Key: This key is available to everybody, it is now secret.

1.2

Algorithms Types

Here is a general overview of these two cryptography standards.
Private Key algorithm:
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A private key algorithm uses one password (or one private key) to encrypt a
message, to decrypt it the same password is used. The same algorithm or a different one
can be used to crypt and decrypt.
Public key algorithm:
A publie key algorithm consists o f a public key (B) used to encrypt a message and
a private key (A) used to decrypt the message, for one public key there is one private key
(A l, B l) and only the private key that belongs to the public key can decrypt a message
encrypted by the public key.
Due to this, everyone can use the public key, if someone wants to send message,
they encrypt the message with the receiver’s public key, and only the receiver, who
knows the private key, can decrypt this message.
This algorithm can also be used to sign a message to prove that it is really the
sender who is sending a message, to do so the sender encrypts the message with his
private key that can be decrypted only with the public key.

1.3 Cryptography Standards
Introduction
A lot o f cryptography algorithms have been created, it is not the aim o f this report
to go into great detail about cryptography, so only two of the most famous and used
cryptography algorithms are going to be quickly explained to give a general idea o f how
to encrypt a message.
DES
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DES stands for "Data Encryption Standard" and is at the moment the most used
algorithm in the world, being used by the American government to secure their sensitive
data. It has been created by IBM (International Business Machines Corporation) in 1977
and is a private key algorithm.
It is a block cipher algorithm that crypts data by 64 bits length block, that means
that the clear text is divided into 64 bits length block and each block is encrypted by 16
complex operations. The entire 64-bit length encrypted block constitutes the final cipher
text. The decryption algorithm is nearly the same as the encryption algorithm, the same
key (the private key) is used to encrypt and to decrypt a message; the bigger the private
key is the safer it is.
RSA
RSA is the initial o f the name o f its creator: Ron RIVEST, Adi SHAMIR and
Leonard ADLEMAN. It is one o f the first public key algorithms and was created in 1978.
In fact there are two algorithms, one to generate the keys and one to encrypt/decrypt the
message; the pair o f keys, one public and one private, are based on big first numbers and
are the result o f some calculations (modulo, Euclid’s algorithm, etc). The algorithm that
encrypts/decrypts a message is a block cipher algorithm that is simpler than the DES
algorithm but is much slower.
The security of this algorithm is based on mathematical theories (big numbers
factorization), even if no real proof has been given to demonstrate that these
mathematical theories are not easily "breakable", they have not been broken for 20 years.
These two algorithms have different concepts, but neither o f them is better than
the other, they have their own advantages. A good idea is to use both o f them choosing
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which one depending on its suitability to a specific job. It is why DES is usually used to
encrypt the message, and RSA is used to communicate only the DES private key used to
encrypt the message.
The reason for this choice is because DES is faster than RSA and more difficult to
break. However, to communicate the DES private key a secure solution has to be found.
RSA has a good level o f security and the user does not have to send his private key to the
recipient, only the publie key is to be transmitted. This is why RSA is used to encrypt the
DES private key, followed by the message and then sent to the reeipient.

1.4

Possible Applications

The aim o f this seetion is to give concrete examples o f professional eryptography
used, which will help the reader to appreciate more the work done on the project.
1] Login password; Here the password typed by the user is encrypted and eompared to
with the user's enerypted password stored in the password database. If the user did not
make any mistakes while typing his password then the two cipher texts will be identical
and the user is allowed to log onto the system.
2] Pretty good Privaey; This is a famous application for encrypting personal data such as
letters, emails, a file or anything else found on a computer; because it is very powerful
and has been developed on almost all existing computers (PC, Macintosh, Amiga, etc). In
fact, it is the first application that has been developed for public as a pose to military use.
It is maybe why PGP is becoming a standard application on computers. The only problem
is the lack o f a good Graphical User Interface (GUI).
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1.5 Common Cryptography Attacks
Introduction
There are different ways to attack a cryptography algorithm. If the algorithm
security is only based on its secret, once someone finds the algorithm source code it will
be very easy to break it.
Algorithm attacks
Sometimes a cryptography algorithm can have weak points, for example, with
algorithms that just consist o f adding the same number to all the password letters they are
easier to break. This is because it is simple; all that is to be done it to find the number
used. This attack needs strong cryptography knowledge and understanding. It is only used
for bad cryptography algorithms, but as with everything relating to computer science; it is
very difficult to totally avoid making errors, so this attack is always the first one
attempted. If no weak points are found the only attack that can be done is the "brute
force" attack. Some advanced techniques used are Linear and Differential cryptanalysis
which will be discussed later in the thesis.
Brute force attack
This attack is based on the cipher text generated by a cryptography algorithm. If
the attacker can get into the password database, and even if all the passwords in it are
encrypted, software exists that simply try every possible passwords, encrypts them and
compares the cipher text generated with the one held in the password database. O f course,
it would take too long to try all the possible passwords, present computers are not fast
enough and there are too many possibilities.
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Keeping these in mind, Cryptographers need to provide the world with a new
encryption standard. Many o f the unbroken are protected by patents. If the world is to
have a secure, unpatented, and freely- available eneryption algorithm, we need to develop
several candidate encryption algorithms now. These algorithms can then be subjected to
years o f public scrutiny and cryptanalysis. Then, the hope is that one or more eandidate
algorithms will survive this proeess, and can eventually become a new standard. The
purpose o f the thesis is to discuss the requirements for a standard encryption algorithm.
While it may not be possible to satisfy all requirements with a single algorithm, it may be
possible to satisfy them with a family o f algorithms based on the same cryptographic
principles. It introduees a new cryptographie algorithm and goes on to discuss how the
algorithm overcomes known attacks like Linear and Differential eryptanalysis. It
identifies a potential weakness in the algorithm and goes on to describe how the
algorithm overcomes it.
DCA (Dynamic Cryptography Algorithm), a new private-key block cipher, is
proposed. The block size is user defined, and the key can be o f infinite length. The
algorithm is a first o f its kind dynamic algorithm in which almost all components change
depending o f the password itself used to generate a key or encrypt a file. The “Key
dependency” has been pushed to the extreme with dynamically linked components like
number o f rounds, operation used on eaeh bits, shift window, direetion o f each operation
(Left or Right), size o f the key buffer when encrypting a file, size o f the block shuffle and
working file block.
The actual encryption o f data is performed in two modules. Key generation and
File encryption and is very effieient on all microprocessors. Key generation requires a
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seed as input, whose size is N/2 for key size N. Key generation is a complex procedure of
Key Padding, Concatenating bits, initial scrambling, key encryption and final scrambling.
File encryption consists o f complex steps o f initialization, seeding and shuffling. All
default settings can also be changed by the user, which means the knowledge required to
decrypt/reproduce a key gets extended to the environment settings as well as the
password itself.
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CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW
Several Cryptography algorithms have been designed in the past. Discussing all of
them is beyond the scope o f this project. However the major ones have been listed
according to their type.

2.1

Message Digest Algorithms

As an Internet standard (RFC 1321), message digest algorithms have been
employed in a wide variety o f security applications, and is also commonly used to check
the integrity o f files. A message digest hash is typically a 32-character hexadecimal
number. Recently, a number o f projects have created message digest "rainbow tables"
which are easily accessible online, and can be used to reverse many hashes into strings
that collide with the original input.

MD5:
Designer:
Ron Rivest
References:
[16], [17], [18], [19], [20]
Digest length:
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16 bytes.
Block size:
64 bytes.
Max. final bloek size:
55 bytes.
State size:
16 bytes.
Comments:
• A transcription error was found in the original MD5 draft RFC. The
corrected algorithm should be called MD5a, though some people refer to it
as MD5.
This is wrong; the corrected algorithm should be called MD5, and is in
practice never referred to as MD5a.
•

MD5 is big-bit-endian, little-byte-endian, and left-justified.

Security comment:
Hans Dobbertin has found a method o f generating collisions for MD5's
compression function. Quoting from RSA Laboratories Security Bulletin #4:
“Given the surprising speed with which techniques on MD4 were extended to
MD5 we feel that it is only prudent to draw a cautious conclusion and to expect
that collisions for the entire hash function might soon be found. In addition, the
128-bit output is arguably not long enough to make generating collisions using a
birthday attack infeasible.”

10
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Ripemed-320:
Designers:
Hans Dobbertin, Antoon Bosselaers, Bart Preneel
Published:
April 1996
Alias:
"RIPEMD320"
References:
[21], [22], [23], [24]
Digest length:
40 bytes.
Block size:
64 bytes.
Max. final block size:
55 bytes.
State size;
20 bytes.
Comment:
RIPEMD-320 is big-bit-endian, little-byte-endian, and left-justified.
Security comment:
This message digest is not claimed to provide a security level higher than
RIPEMD-160. SHA-384, SHA-512 or Whirlpool is used instead.

11
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SHA-512:
Designers:
U.S. National Security Agency
Published:
October 2000

Referenees:
[25]
Digest length:
64 bytes.
Block size:
128 bytes.
Max. final block size;
111 bytes.
State size:
64 bytes.
Comment:
SHA-{256,384,512} are big-bit-endian, big-byte-endian, and left-justified.
When the compression function is used directly, it is considered to inelude
the chaining variable addition (as opposed to being separate as shown in
the specification).

2.2 Message Authentication Code Algorithms

12
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A cryptographic message authentication code (MAC) is a short piece o f information used
to authenticate a message. A MAC algorithm accepts as input a seeret key and an
arbitrary-length message to be authenticated, and outputs a MAC (sometimes known as a
tag). The MAC value protects both a message's integrity as well as its authenticity, by
allowing verifiers (who also possess the secret key) to detect any changes to the message
content. A Message Integrity Code (MIC) is another name for a MAC.
HMAC (Digest);
Designers;
Mihir Bellare, Ran Canetti, Hugo Krawczyk, Adi Shamir
Published:
June 1996
Aliases:
"HmacMDS" is an alias to HMAC(MD5) [JDK compatibility]
"HmacSHAl" is an alias to HM AC(SHA-l) [JDK compatibility]
"1.3.6.1.5.5.8.1.1 " is an alias to HMAC(MD5)
"1.3.6.1.5.5.8.1.2" is an alias to HM AC(SHA-l)
"1.3.6.1.5.5.8.1.3" is an alias to HMAC(Tiger)
"1.3.6.1.5.5.8.1.4" is an alias to HMAC(R1PEMD-160)
(source for OlDs from
iso.org.dod.internet.seeurity.meehanisms.ipsec.isakmpOakley tree)
•

"http://www.w3.Org/2000/02/xmldsig#hmac-shal " is an alias to

HM AC(SHA-l)
References:

13
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[26], [27], [28], [29], [30]

Parameters:
•

String digest [creation/read, no default] - the name o f the Block
MessageDigest on which this MAC is to be based.

Key length:
Any multiple o f 8 bits that does not cause the maximum input length for the
MessageDigest to be exceeeded. Default 128 bits.
Output length:
Minimum 32 bits, maximum equal to the message digest output length. The
default is equal to the message digest output length.

2.3

Symmetric Key Algorithms

Symmetric-key algorithms are a class o f algorithms for cryptography that use
trivially related cryptographic keys for both decryption and encryption.
The encryption key is trivially related to the decryption key, in that they may be
identical or there is a simple transform to go between the two keys. The keys, in practice,
represent a shared secret between two or more parties that can be used to maintain a
private information link.
Other terms for symmetric-key encryption are single-key, one-key and privatekey encryption. Use o f the latter term can sometimes conflict with the term private key in
public key cryptography.
AES256 (Advanced Encryption Standard):

14
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Designers:
Joan Daemen, Vincent Rijmen
Alias:
"OpenPGP.Cipher.9"
Description:
AES256 is defined as Rijndael with a 128-bit block size and 14 rounds.
References:
[31], [32], [33], [34], [35], [36], [37], [38], [39], [40], [41]
Key length:
256 bits.
Block size:
16 bytes.
Security Comment:
• There are claims that the XSL (Extended Sparse Linearization) [42] attack can
break the AES. Since AES is already widely used in commerce and government
for the transmission o f secret information, finding a teehnique that can shorten
the amount o f time it takes to retrieve the secret message without having the key
would have wide implications. Opinions differ on whether the attack works
because the method is heuristic and very teehnical, and so it has proved difficult
to evaluate its complexity. In addition, the method is expected to have a high
work-factor, which unless lessened, means the technique would not reduee the
effort to break AES very much in comparison to an exhaustive search.
Therefore, even if the attack has been analyzed correctly, it is unlikely to affect

15
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the real-world security of block ciphers in the near future. Nonetheless, the
attack has caused some experts to express greater unease at the algebraic
simplicity o f the current AES.
DES (Data Eneryption Standard):
Designers:
Don Coppersmith, Horst Feistel, Walt Tuchmann, U.S. National Security Agency
Published:
1976
References:
[43], [44], [45], [46], [47], [48], [49], [50], [51], [52], [53], [54], [55], [56]
Key length:
64 bits as encoded; 56 bits excluding parity bits.
Block size:
8 bytes.
Comment:
Implementations MUST ignore (i.e. not check) the parity bits o f keys.
KeyGenerators for DES MUST, however, output keys with correct parity.
Security comment:
The fixed 56-bit effective key length is too short to prevent brute-foree attacks [2]
DES is also vulnerable to Differential and linear eryptanalysis.
RC4:
Designer:
Ron Rivest

16
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Published:
September 1994
Alias:
"ARCFOUR"
References:
[57], [58], [59], [60], [61], [62], [63], [64], [65], [66], [67], [68], [69], [70], [71],
[72], [73]
Key length:
Minimum 8, maximum 2048, multiple o f 8 bits; default 128 bits.
Security comments:
•

There are small biases at the start o f the RC4 key stream.

•

The RC4 keystream is distinguishable from random given about 2 Gbytes
o f the stream.

•

RC4 is vulnerable to related-key attacks, and therefore it should only be
used with keys that are generated by a strong RNG, or by a source o f bits
that are sufficiently uncorrelated (such as the output o f a hash function).

2.4

Block Cipher algorithms

In cryptography, a block cipher is a symmetric key cipher which operates on
fixed-length groups o f bits, termed blocks, with an unvarying transformation. When
encrypting, a block cipher might take a (for example) 128-bit block of plaintext as input,
and output a corresponding 128-bit block of cipher text. The exact transformation is
controlled using a second input — the secret key. Decryption is similar: the decryption

17
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algorithm takes, in this example, a 128-bit block o f cipher text together with the secret
key, and yields the original 128-bit block o f plaintext.
ECB (Electronic Codebook):
Description:
Electronic Codebook Mode, as defined in NBS FIPS PUB 81.
References:
[74], [75]
Comment:
If a padding scheme is not specified (i.e. the algorithm name is given in the form
''cipherNamelV.C'Q"), then NoPadding MUST be assumed (note that this is
intentionally different to CBC and PCBC modes, for which PKCSPadding would
be used). The standard name always specifies which padding method is used, i.e.
it always has three components.
Security comment:
ECB mode will always encrypt identical plaintext blocks to identical ciphertexts.
This can be a weakness when the plaintext is not random, uniformly distributed,
and a multiple o f the block size. If these conditions are not satisfied, a different
mode should probably be used.
CBC (Cipher Block Chaining):
Description:
Cipher Block Chaining Mode, as defined in NBS FIPS PUB 81.
References:
[76], [77], [78]
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Comment:
If a padding scheme is not specified (i.e. the algorithm name is given in the form
"cipherName/CBC"), then PKCSPadding MUST be assumed. The standard name
always specifies which padding method is used, i.e. it always has three
components.

2.5 Asymmetric Key algorithms
RSA:
Designers:
Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, Leonard Adelman
Aliases:
"RSAES", "1.2.840.113549.1.1.1", "2.5.8.1.1"
References:
[79], [80], [81], [82], [83], [84]
Comment:
It is recommended that implementations make no practical restriction on
the lengths o f the key parameters n and e (in particular, values o f n up to at least
4096 bits SHOULD be supported).
Security Comments:
•

The most damaging would be for an attacker to discover the private key
corresponding to a given public key; this would enable the attacker both to
read all messages encrypted with the public key and to forge signatures. The
obvious way to do this attack is to factor the public modulus, n, into its two
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prime factors, p and q. From p, q, and e, the public exponent, the attacker
can easily get d, the private exponent. The hard part is factoring n; the
security o f RSA depends on factoring being difficult. In fact, the task of
recovering the private key is equivalent to the task o f factoring the modulus:
use d to factor n, as well as use the factorization o f n to find d.
Patent status:
RSA is patented in the United States and Canada (see references); the patent is
licensed by RSA Data Security, Inc.
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CHAPTER III

ALGORITHM DESCRIPTION
3.1 Introduction
The Dynamic Cryptography algorithm has the following features:
-Private Key Algorithm
-Dynamic Cryptography Algorithm
-Source code can be public without making the algorithm weak
-Multiplatform application
-Infinite key length (as big as the integer type being used)
-Bilateral bits swapping with variable windows
-Bilateral Pseudo randomly binary operations
-Dynamic Variables changing in functions of the password, such as:
-Round, Block Shuffle, etc
-Key buffering against key dependency attacks
-Addition of a random number to the key
-Random Number Generator (RNG) using the ISAAC Algorithm
-Possibility to specify own RNG seed
-5 different crypt's level (allowing to choose between efficiency
and speed)
-Seed and shuffle functions
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-Seed and shuffle functions
-A clear text can be encrypted using its own data
-Two methods of execution: direct disk access or memory cache
-Strong Key generator
The DCA has been made as dynamie as possible; this means almost all o f its
components will change depending o f the password itself used to generate a key or
enerypt a file. This is called “Key Dependency” (KD) and has been pushed to the
extreme in the DCA with dynamically linked components such as:
The number o f rounds
The operation used on each bits
The shift window
The direction of each operation (Left or Right)
The size of the key buffer when encrypting a file
The size o f the block shuffle and working file block.

The algorithm behaviour changes to great extent when used with different passwords.
All default settings can also be changed by the user, which means the knowledge required
to decrypt/reproduce a key gets extended to the environment settings as well as the
password itself.
Algorithm Overview:
The algorithm is made o f a number of modules and sub-modules.
The Key Generator module
The File Encryption module
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The “file decryption” module has been left out in purpose as it is nothing more than
running the “file encryption” module backwards.

3.2 Key Generator Overview
Pre-requisites
There are a number o f pre-requisites to this module:
Seed source:
The Seed can be a password, a key, or the result o f a random algorithm (ISAAC,
time/date based, or user customised).
-

Keylength Output:
The minimum keylength that can be generated is 128bits. Larger keys will be a
multiple o f 128. There is no upper limit to the size of key.

-

Keylength Input:
The seed must be at least o f size N/2 when generating a key o f size N. In other
words, when generating a 128bits key and using a password, the user must enter a
password o f at least 8 characters (8*8bits = 64bits).

Terminology
KD - Key Dependant - a value which is “Key Dependant” will be different each time a
different key is used.

P R N - Pseudo Random Number - In general, all references to Random Number in this
document should be taken as a reference to a Pseudo Random Number.
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LO - Logical Operation - This can be also referenced as a XO R , AN D , NO R, N AN D , etc

L F SR - Linear Feedback Shift Register - Algorithm used to generate /W V with the least
repetition possible for its output numbers.

Integer Size is 32 bits - The use of a 32 bits hardware platform is assumed.

IS A A C - T h is is a fast cryptography random generator ereated by Bob Jenkins and used
in the DCA. The details o f the IS A A C Algorithm will not be discussed in this document.

Below is a description of the different Key Generator steps:

-

STEP 1: Key Padding
If the initial seed used to generate the key is not equal to the size o f the keylength
to be generated some Pseudo-Random numbers (KD) will be inserted at a position
with is KD.

-

STEP 2: Bits Concatenation
The seeds bits will be stored into one long string of bits. An Integer array will be
used for this purpose and the size o f each element will be dependant o f the
hardware platform used: 64, 32 or 16 bits, (or even 128, 256, etc when available).

-

STEP 3: Initial Scrambling
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The different seed bits will be combined together to generate a Pseudo Random
Number (which is therefore KD). This PRN will then be added to the each seed
element. Eaeh time the PRN is added it will change (KD).

STEP 4: Key Encryption
The seeds will now be referenced as the key. Each o f its bits will be treated
individually and will be subject to some Logical Operations (LO). This is called
“a round”. In each round the following happens:
o

A bit swap or a LO

o

The distance between 2 bits (Shift Window) is KD

o

The nature o f the operation (a swap or LO) is KD

o

The number o f round is KD

o

The direction o f the round is KD (left or right)

For each key generated the minimum number o f rounds is two, this will ensure
that all bits have been swapped at least once AND have had a LO .
The number o f rounds is also KD.

STEP 5: Final Scrambling
A PRN is generated if no random seed is provided and will be added to each
element o f the Key. Each time the PRN is added it is changed using a Linear
Feedback Shift Register (LFSR)
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3.3 Key Generator Details

H |E|L|L|0|W |0|R|L|D
Saving password
into Pass_clear[]

Length = L

Na

Nb

Nc +

Nc

Nd

Nb o f Char to
add = NB ADD

Nd = POS

Nc = P O S / 10
Nd = P O S - ( N a * 10)

Yes

POS> L ?

i.e.: if POS = 25 then N c = 2 and Nd = 5

No

Stop

IndexA
IndexB

Pass clear] Na| % Li
= Pass clear]Nb] % Ll

N ew C har = Pass clear]lndexa] & P ass clear]lndexb]

IN SE R T N ew C har

in P ass clear]PO S]

Nb o f Char
< NB ADD ?

Yes

Na = Na + 1
Nb = N b + 1

POS - POS +1
No

Stop

Figure 3.1 Key Padding
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72 I 69 I 76 I 76 I 79 I 87 I 45 I 34 1 103 | 23 | 12 | 10 | 79 | 82 | 76 | 68

T

------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Password in clear

01001000
01000101

01001000010001011010

Conversion in bits and concatenation

..

If using 16 bits integer

Figure 3.2 Bits
Concatenation

Figure 3.3 Initial Scrambling
See Figure 3.3a - Add() - Random Generation
and Figure 3.3b - Add() - Pass code Generation
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010010000100010110100011011001101 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 . . .
If using a
128 bit KEY,
with 16 bits
integer

0100100001000101
XOR

0100100001000100

010001101100110
XOR

0100100001000100

0000111010001001

0110100010000001
---------------- Pseudo-Random
number PR N-i

Figure 3.3a - Add() - Random
Generation
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0100100001000101 10100011011001101 I o il .I

Q

G G

0100100001000101

If using 16 bits integer

G

If using a
128
bits KEY,
with 16 bits
integer.
Pass clear

Using new PRIN-i+1
Same process as

0000000000000101

G > .n j ©

Shift w indow SWa

0110100010000001
Pseudo-Random
number PRN-i

Circular shift o f P R N -i using the SW
window
I.e.; if SW a = 0101 = 5
Then 5 bits will be shifted from the
left to the right.

0001000000101101
------------------ N ew P R N -i+ I

0100100001000101

0101100001101000

0001010010011000

1

11.. 1 1

I

I I

N ew string generated.
Pass code

Figure 3.3b - AddQ - Pass code
Generation

29

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The following diagram describes an overview of this process:

Figure 3.4a Swao( ) - Init
P H A SE 1: R epeat until all bits have
been through either a SW A P or
O P E R A T IO N

Figure 3.4b - Swap( ) - Modulo
Generation

P H A SE 2 R epeat PH A SE 1 until the
number o f R O U N D is finished
(default Round = 2)

Figure .3.4c - Swap( )

Figure 3.4d - Swap( ) Operation

Figure 3.4 - Swap( )
Overview

The following 4 diagrams describe the detailed process:
Figure 3.4a - Swap( ) - Init
Figure 3.4b - Swap( ) - Modulo Generation
Figure 3.4c - Swap( ) - Direction
Figure 3.4d - Swap( ) - Operation
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I n itia lis a tio n

M odulo_Big = K E Y L E N G T H - 2
M odulo Sm all = M odulo Big / 2
i= 0

0101100001101000 I 0001010010011000 I 11.. I ..
1101110101001011

Pass code) fl

Pass code| 1 |

Pass code| 2

XOR

XOR

XOR

Pass code I 3
Vo (Round +1)

Additional Rounds AH'

Round + AR

Operation
(either 0 or 1)

Direction
(either 0 or 1)

Modulo
(either 0 or 1)

New Dynamic round DRound. (max
value is 2x original nb of round)

Yes

M odulo
= 0?

m odulo sw ap =
m odulo big

No

m odulo sw ap=
m odulo sm all

Figure 3.4a Swap( ) - Init
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Pass code

OlOllOOOOllOIOOO I 0001010010011000 I 11.. I ..

...

1 . 01 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1

P a ssco d el i |

(

XOR

1

Pass codel i+1

modulo swap

until
i=K E Y L EN G T H

m odulo session

m odulo session

Shift w indow S W i

Figure 3.4c - Swap( ) Direction

Figure 3.4b - Swap( ) - Modulo
Generation
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Figure 3.4b - Swap( ) - Modulo
Generation

Direction

XOR

L E FT D irection

Pass code

0101100001101000

1101110101001011

Yes
=

No

0?

SVV6

i

Bit A = pass codel i )

j

Bit B = pass_codc( i+SWI>i-l j

R IG H T D irection

Pass code

1101110101001011

0101100001101000

Bit A = pass code| KEYLENGTH -1 - i

Figure 3.4d - Swap( )
- Operation
Figure 3.4c - Swap( ) Direction
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Figure 3.4c - Swap( ) Direction

Yes

SW AP

Operation
=

0

?

Bit A

B itB

No

O pération Choice = pass code| i j % 5

Opération Choice = pass codel i + I ] % 5
B itB

Bit A

CHANGING
Bit A and B

Choice 0 = Bit A *XOR* Bit B
Choice 1 = 1 *XOR* (Bit A *OR* Bit B)
Choice 2 = Bit A *OR* Bit B
Choice 3 = Bit A *AND* Bit B
Choice 4= 1

New Bit A

*XOR* (Bit A *AND* Bit B)

New Bit B

Yes
Modulo Swap
= Modulo Big

M odulo Swap = M odulo Small

No

M odulo Swap = Modulo Bi;

Operation = Operation *XOR* 1

Figure 3.4b - Swap( ) - Modulo
Generation
---------------Figure 3.4d - Swap( ) Operation
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Initialisation
i=0

If no random number is already provided in the function parameter, then:
Generate Random key either with the ISAAC algorithm or with the system
time.
Pass code

1001000101010110

0001000111100011

If using 16 bits integer
R andom key

Index I

Pass code|lndex 1]
XOR

Random key

Pass code|lndex 11

LINEAR FEEDBACK SHIFT REGISTER (LFSR)
(W ith a d if fe re n t p rim itiv e p o ly n o m ia l w h en u sin g 6 4 ,3 2 o r 16 b its

New Random key

Pass rodeji

Yes
io

Index 1
XOR

Pass code|i]

New Random key

No

i = i+ 1

Figure 3.5 Final
Scrambling
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The important functions are discussed below with and example for 512 bits key
generation.
Key generator
The key lengths that are generated are powers o f two (e.g. 2^x, 128 bits, 256, 512,
1024, etc). To generate a key there are two different methods: randomly or pseudorandomly. For the random method, 16 random characters are generated and stored in the
memory. For the pseudo-random method, the user is asked to type some characters that
are then stored in the memory, the maximum number o f characters that can be entered is
16. 16 characters correspond to a key length of 128 bits, this is because one character is
represented by 8 bits on a computer, therefore 16 characters represent 128 bits (16 * 8 =
128), 32 characters represent 256 bits (32 * 8 = 256) and so on. Then several functions
are used to generate a key, using these characters which are stored in the memory like a
password, this string o f characters is called: "pass clear".
The number o f different combinations is higher with the Random method (2**128) than
with the Pseudo-Random method (72**16 i.e. approximately 2**99). This is because the
user has to type some characters and there are only around 72 symbols readily available
on a standard keyboard. If only un-shifted alphanumeric characters are used then the
round falls to around 2**83 combinations.
Test length function
It is important that the key's length is always the same, so if the length of the
"pass clear" string is inferior to the key's length, some characters are then added to the
string. The number of characters the user has to type must be at least half the number of
characters in the key. Each new added characters is the result o f an AND logical
operation between two characters randomly picked up in the "pass clear" string of
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characters. Now, if the key to be generated is 128 bits (which correspond to 16
characters) the new "pass clear" length is 16 characters.
When generating a key o f more than 128 bits, first a 128 bit key length is
generated and used to generate a 256 bit key length, and so on. This ispossible because
the first key has got the minimum number o f characters required to generate the
following key (128 bits = 16 characters, 256 bits = 32 characters, 512 bits - 64
characters, etc). The key generated then becomes the password for the following key. The
different steps during a 512 bits key length generation are:
•The user types 16 characters as a password.
•If less than 16 characters are typed; some new characters are generated to reach the 16
characters needed.
•A key (A l) o f 128 bits is generated from the password typed at the step 1.
•The key (A l) is used to generate another key.
•The key (A2) o f 256 bits is then generated from the Key (A l).
•Because the key (A l) is twice inferior to the key (A2), the same process used at the step
2 has to be done, but this time, we check if there are at least 32 characters (256 bits) in
(A l).
•The key (A2) is used to generate another key.
•W e repeat step 6 but this time with (A2).
•The final key (A3) is a 512 key length.
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Password

OH

K ey
Generator

Random generation flag

by Soiembh

O
YES
Kigtlitosy

karfh^

NO
1r
K«5r2"K*yl

K>ey2= K*y3

1
K*y2

;

K ey
G enerator

NO
KjÿhJsey

■Am
'C ^ ^ p

C

&

Z

Jenjth?

YES

I

Figure 3.6 Long key generation

Transcription function
The string o f character "pass clear" is converted into a string o f numbers called
"pass code", these numbers are the ASCII code o f each character contained in the
"pass clear" string.
Additional function
It is better not to directly manipulate the ASCII code contained in the "pass code"
string. This is why a number will be added to each number contained in this string by an
Exclusive OR operation. This number is generated in function o f the password itself. To
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make it safer, each time the number is added it is different we do this by using a circular
bit shifting.
Swapping function
This is the main part o f the algorithm, all the numbers contained in the pass code"
string are considered to be only one long string o f bits. First, the bits are swapped with
each other; each swap takes place between two bits that have a distance o f X bits.
The cipher password is a long string of integer, each integer o f this string will be assigned
to X. Because while doing this bit swapping process the cipher password will be
consistently changing so will the string o f integer and therefore the value o f X. X should
never have the same value. The swap starts from the bit B i at the position 0 with the bit
at the position B l + X I. After, from the bit B2 at the end o f the string with the bit at the
position B2 - X2. This continues with the second bit o f the string B3 and the bit B3 + X3,
and with the next to last bit B4 with the bit B4 - X4, and so on. In fact, as shown in, the
following rule is respected;
Swap bit I with bit I + X 1
Swap bit 'endofstring' - 1 with bit 'endofstring' - X2
This starts again with 1 = 1 + 1 and a different X from the "swap length" array.

39

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Sotgaàh Ghost
Sw^ 2

Swap 1

4

KEY =

0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0

1

-

Î

4

1 .. . 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0A 1

Î J

Î

Swap 4

Swap 3

After S w ^ 1 :

KEY =

0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 ,.

After Swap

1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 I 1 1 0

1

. 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0

0

J

2;

'■

KEY =

0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1.

After Swap 3 ;

KEY =

0 0 1 1 0

0 1 1 0

1 -, . 1 1 1 0

0 1 1 0

1 ..

0 10 0 1 1 1 0

0

After Swap 4 :

KEY =

0 0 1 1 0

0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0

Figure 3.7 Bit swapping

This is called bilateral bit swapping, with this function all the bits will be swapped
around.
The second part o f this swapping function is the same process, but this time
instead o f swapping bits around, a pseudo-random binary operation, function of the
password itself, will be generated. There are 5 different types o f binary operations;
Exclusive OR, NAND, NOR, OR, AND.
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The way the algorithm works is that it alternates a swap and a logical operation
each time. The algorithm does this in a loop until all the bits have been used (in a swap or
a logical operation), the user can change the "round" o f this loop with a parameter: it is
the number o f loops the user wants the algorithm to perform. By default it is 2 (which is
also the minimum) as with this value we are sure that ALL the bits have been used in a
swap AND a logical operation.
By changing the value o f the round the user is changing the result generated.
Also, the algorithm will:
- Start from the right or the left o f the bits string
- Start by a swap or a logical operation.
When this is finished there is a new “pass code” string, which contains numbers
totally different from the start.
Coding function
To make this encryption algorithm more efficient, a final part has been created. A
random number is added to each number o f the "pass code" string. This random number
is initialized at the beginning o f the function. Each time this random number is added, its
bits are shifted to the left, the value of this shift is a number generated in function of the
character contained in the "pass clear" string. Therefore, each time the random number is
added, it is different. Due to the random number, even if the user types the same
password to generate the key, he can have 2^31 different keys (if we use a long random
number = 4 bytes = 32 bits).
The random number will be hidden in the key at a position that will depend on the
cipher string, because when a user types his password again we need to recover it. The
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key generation will then follow the same process as the first time it was done. To recover
this random number, if the password is right the algorithm will know its position.
Otherwise, the position will be wrong as will the random number used in the coding
function and the key generated will be different.
The user can choose 2 ways to generate a random number: using the standard C
function or use the ISAAC algorithm created by Bob Jenkins. The default RNG is
ISAAC. The initial seed will be initialized by the /dev/random or /dev/urandom device if
present on the system, otherwise it would be the result o f “time() + cloekQ”. We are
aware that the second method hasn’t got a big entropy for the pool o f numbers, therefore
the user can overwrite the seed value in his application really easily (for example: after
the binit() call just add the line: varinit->SEED = 666, to set the SEED to 666).

3.4 File Encryption Overview
Process
Below is a brief description o f the different File Encryption steps
STEP 1: Initialization
o

The file is mapped into a virtual array and spit into blocks. The length of
the block is KD.

o

Several keys are generated from the password or keyfile

o

Only one key will be generated with a random number, encrypted and
inserted into the encrypted file. The insertion position is K D.

o

That random key will be used to generate a PRN.
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STEP 2: Seeding
o

A number o f keys (KD) will be generated and stored into a Key Buffer
using a derivation o f the initial key generated and the PRN previously
generated as the random seed,

o

From that key buffer 2 keys will be selected (KD) and an A N D will be
conducted. The result is an Encryption Key.

o

A block will be selected from the file virtual array (KD) and an X O R will
be conducted with the Encryption Key.

o

A New key will be derived from one o f the 2 keys used in creating the
Encryption key and replace one of the 2 keys,

o

The process repeats again at STEP 2 until all the blocks have been
encrypted (seeded).

STEP 3: Shuffling
o

The same virtual array used in STEP 1 will be used again,

o

Two blocks will be selected (KD).

o

One out o f three possible LO will be conducted (KD) on those two blocks.
The result is an Encryption block,

o

A third block will be selected (KD) as the block to be encrypted and an
X O R will be conducted with the Encryption Block,

o

One o f the two blocks used to generate the Encryption block will then be
selected to be the next block to be encrypted (K D ).
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o

The process start again at STEP 3 until all the blocks, but the last two,
have been encrypted (shuffled),

o

The last 2 blocks will be encrypted using an X O R with 2 new keys
generated. Not shuffling the last 2 blocks is required for the decryption
process.
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3.5 File Encryption Details

Figure 3.8a - file_crypt() - Init and Figure 3.8b - file_crypt() -SeedQ - Random
Generation
C lear T ext File

Hello World,
This is a test file in clear text which we are about to
encrypt. First we are going to “split” that file into a
number of blocks.
Red Square = Single Bloek crypt
Length = Bloek shuffle

7

Block
1
8

10

T ab Seed
and
T ab Shuffle

11

Password

OR

Key File

Key G enerator
using random
number

Not

(OnMl)
Key Buffer = Key_Buffer + IV Keyl 0 |
(Max 2x original Key buffer value)

IV Key

Initialisation

i = P ass_ co d e| 1 |
D ynam ic sh uffle = IV _K ey[ 11 % 32 (if using 32 bits integer)
B lock sh uffle = D ynam ic shuffle + B lock shuffle
B lock cryp t = File length in bytes
Block shuffle is define with the follow ing rules:
a) It must be a multiple o f 4 bytes ( if using 32 bits integer)
b) Block crypt / block shuffle >= 6

Figure 3 .8 a file_crypt() - Init
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Initialization

Key B uffer = 1 6 (Can be changed by user)
NB index = K E Y L E N G T H / 32 (when using 32 bits integer)

IV KEY

Key Generator
Not using random
number

Key Generator
With random
number

( Cod» ) )

XOR

P assco d eB

Pos key = Pass_codeB| 0 ) % block_crypt
Tab seed|Pos key| - 1 (not to be used again)

Codc_key

In s e r t “en cryp ted ” random k ey in to file at
p o stio n “ P os K e y ”

, Code_key[ 0 ]
XOR

First RN

RN = New RN

RN = First RN

RN

XOR

No

i = i +1
i > NB Index ?

New RN

Yes

RN

Figure 3.8b - file_crypt() -SeedQ - Random Generation
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Pass code»

Key Generator
With RN as a random number.
Because of LSFR RN will
change each round

P ass codeB = Key i

Nb ot Key
generated
Key buffer?

Store K ey i into
KeybufTer a rra y .
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indexB = PasscodeB! 1 ]
Pos = Pass codeBI i |

Keybuffer_array|indexB|

Tab Seed|Pos|
I ?

—

Keybuffer arraylindexA]

New IndexA and IndexB
must be different from
previous IndexA

Pos = Pos + 1

I ------------------

hde to S
Pass codeC

Block at
Position Pos
PasscodeB =
key bn f fe r a rray [I ndcx B|

Crypted Block

Replace tile clear text block with the
crypted block Tab_Seed|pos| = I

Figure 3 .1 0 a file_crypt() ShuffleO Initialization

^

^

All file cleartext
blocks seeded'’

K cyi

Replace Keybuffer array! IndexAj
with Key i

Figure 3.9 Seeding
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Figure 3.10 Shuffling
See Figure 3.10a - file cryptQ - Shuffle() - Initialization
And Figure 3.10b - file cryptQ - ShuffleQ - Position & Operation
And Figure 3.10e - file cryptQ - ShuffleQ -L ast 2 bloeks

Initialization

index = IV _K ey|0]
PosA = IV K ey (Index]
PosB = IV K ey [Index + 1 1
R andom seed = IV K ey [Index + 2]
Pos cry p i = “ last block ” (this is because the last block may have a variable size)
Length sh uffle = Length file / Block shuffle (number o f shuffle block in the file to crypt)

Figure 3.10b - file cryptQ - ShuffleQ
Position & Operation
Figure 3.1 Oa - file cryptQ - ShuffleQ - Initialization
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Figure 3.10a - file_crypt() - Shuffle() - Initialization

Yes

Till) shiifflclI’osAI =

PosA = PosA + 1

No
Yes

Tiib_sliiinic|PosA] =

PosB = PosB + I

No
Opération Choice = (PosA + PosB + Pos crypt i % 3
File to Shiiflle
Block at
Position “I’osA”

Choice 0 = Block]PosA] OR Block]PosB]
Choice 1 = NOT ( Block]PosA] OR Block]PosB) )
Position
“PosB”

Choice 2 = NOT ( Block]PosA] AND Block]PosB] )

ik
XOR

Sliiimed BLOCKS

Cry pted BLOCK

Replace file block with the crypted
block Tab Shufllel Pos crypt] = 1

Figure 3.10b file_erypt() ShuffleO - Position

Yes

All block file
shufflecl7
No

Yes
Pos_cr}|it = PosA

Pos_crypt is an
Odd number?

No
RN = L FSR (R andom Seed)
PosA - RN % Length_Shiiine

RN = LFSR(Random Seed)
PosB = RN % Length Shiifne

Figure 3.10b - file_crypt() - ShuffleO - Position & Operation
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Figure 3.10c - file cryptQ - ShuffleQ -L ast 2 blocks

Last 2 block files:
Block Lastl and Block Last2
They cannot be shuffled. Instead, they are
each encrypted as follow.

IV Key

Key G enerator
Not using random
number
( C ijtlcl' ) )

K ey 1

XOR

Block Lastl

K ey 2

XO R

Block Last2

Key G enerator
Not using random
number

( Codef ) )

STOP

Figure 3.10c - file cryptQ - ShuffleQ -L ast 2 blocks

All the KD highlighted in the above steps can be changed to static values, enable
or disable. The same is true for the size o f the "block crypt" as shown Figure 3.10d
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Alternative Block Crypt size. This means that all the above steps can either be conducted
across the entire file or within smaller “working blocks”.

Red Squares = M ultiple block erypi

Block

Figure 3.10d - Alternative Block Crypt size

The

encryption

algorithm

provides

two

methods

to

encrypt

files:

Encrypting a file from a password typed by the user that will be transformed into a key,
or from a key that has already been generated with the Key generator function, described
earlier. If the user wants to use a very long key length, such as 2048 bits, as it is not really
possible to remember a long password, he will have to generate a key and store it in a
secure area; this key will become the password. The user can also choose to encrypt a file
without a password or a key generated with the key generator function. He can simply
choose an existing file, and the key will be some o f the data in this file (most o f the time
in the middle o f the file). This could be really useful if the user does not want to store a
key file.
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There are 5 different power levels to encrypt a file.
Seed function
First, a "file array" is defined, if the user uses a 128 bit key length, the algorithm
will calculate how many blocks o f 128 bits there are in the file that is going to be
encrypted. The "file array" will have as many indexes as there are blocks o f 128 bits in
the file. Each block will match one o f the indexes o f the "file array". There are only two
values that can be found in this array, 'O' when the block has not already been encrypted,
and ']' when the block has been encrypted.
There is a new feature in the new algorithm:
Many keys will be generated and stored in a buffer. By default, 16 keys are
generated. Then the 2 keys will be pseudo randomly selected, mixed together. The key
will be used as a filter by doing an Exclusive OR between the data contained in the file
and the key. The position o f the block file's data (where the filter will be added) is a
function o f the "pass clear" string. This is why when we encrypt a file the blocks
sequence and the blocks length that is going to be encrypted depends on the password
used to encrypt the file. Each time a filter is added, the "file array" is updated to be sure
that a filter will not be added twice at the same position.
When a filter is used, a new key is generated. As a result, the key used as a filter
is always different and always a function of the previous key that has been generated.
To decrypt a file, since an Exclusive OR has been used to encrypt the file, we
simply encrypt the cipher file with the same password again to remove the filters.
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Something important is that when the keys are generated it is not possible to add a
random number, because it is not possible to find it again, once the key has been added to
some data.
This is why with this algorithm, with one password, or key, the user has only one
cipher text.

Password

OR
Key File

K ey generator

i
Key

Logical OR «ith the block's file

Figure 3.11 File encryption and key generation

Random Seed function
The idea was to be able to have more than one cipher text when the same clear
text was encrypted with the same password. This can be achieved by using a random
number in the key generation process. This algorithm is nearly the same as the standard
one, but this time ONE random number is generated and encrypted using the same
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password used to encrypt the clear text. It is then inserted in the cipher text, still at a
position function o f the "pass clear" string. After, this random number is used in the key
generation. Therefore, with this algorithm for ONE password and ONE clear text there
are MANY cipher texts.
To decrypt the cipher text, the random number is extracted from the cipher text
first and the cipher text is encrypted again with the password typed by the user and this
random number. If it is the right password, the right random number will be extracted, the
right keys will be then generated and the algorithm will generate the right clear text.
This algorithm is very strong, indeed if someone tries to decrypt a cipher file, he
will never be sure that he has found the right clear file.
Shuffle function
As for the file seed function we divide the file into blocks (by default block's
length = Default integer width = 4 bytes on Linux)
From the last cipher password generated we are going to extract pseudo-random numbers
to find 3 file locations:
- position to crypt (pos crypt) (we always start with the last block)
- position A used in the crypting process (posa)
- position B used in the crypting process (posb)

The algorithm takes the blocks at the position A and B and does a logical operation
between them (as a function o f the cipher password): OR, NOR, NAND.
Then it adds the result (MASK) with an Exclusive OR to the block at the position
p o scrypt.
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Then, one o f the blocks used to encrypt (A or B) will become the new position to encrypt.
The choice between A and B is done by checking if the position that has just been
encrypted (pos crypt) is an odd number or not. If it is then the new encrypt position will
be pos A otherwise it will be pos B.
This is done to prevent 2 blocks to be used together more than once to encrypt another
block.
Now there are 2 blocks in plain text (in fact they've been "seeded" before) so 2 new
cipher passwords are generates, from the one sent as a parameter to this funetion and is
added to the block with an Exclusive OR.
This function is initiated by encrypting the last block o f the file. This is because o f the
way we divide the file into blocks; If the key's length is 128 bits and the file's length is
260 bits then we have got 3 blocks of 128 bits, but the last block only has 4 bits from the
file. If we were using this block in the "shuffle" process this would be weak.
Therefore the algorithm does not use it and encrypts it at the start o f this function.
The way the algorithm decides which block is going to be encrypted and which blocks
are going to be used to generate the MASK is function o f the password itself. It uses the
value o f the password (A) in a LINEAR FEEDBACK SHIFT REGISTER FUNCTION
(LFSR). This enables the algorithm to generate many different numbers (B) from (A). An
LFSR is really useful to generate a sequence o f pseudo random numbers that are always
the same if generated from the same initial number.
This function has been taken from the book from Bruce Schneier Applied cryptography
Second Edition. The algorithm initializes the LFSR with the password itself. It also uses a
different primitive polynomial modulo 2 in function o f the length o f the "shift register"
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the user is using (16, 32 or 64 bits).
This part is really important as the file is then encrypted with its own content.

If we use the seed and shuffle function to encrypt a file, to decrypt we first need to
"unshuffle" and then "unseed" the encrypted file.
“UNShuffle” function
The algorithm repeats the process as in the file shuffle function except that it does
not make any changes on the file at first. We store the different erypt positions and bloeks
that are used to create the masks.

We then have 3 arrays:
position^ = position o f the block which will be encrypted
crypta[], cryptb[] = position o f the 2 blocks used to create the mask

For example:
position[5] = 500
crypta[5] = 232
cryptb[5] = 1300

This means that the 6th bloek to be encrypted was the bloek number 500 using the blocks
232 and 1300 to generate the mask.
When the algorithm has filled up these 3 arrays, it then decrypts the last 2 blocks and
starts from the end o f the array to the beginning to un-shuffle the file.
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We can compare that to a "cards castle" once we have done the castle if we want to
remove the cards without breaking the castle we need to take out the last card (on the top)
and then the next one, etc in a reverse order.

Dynamic Variables
This is one o f the prominent features o f the algorithm.
The following variables:
•R O U N D
• BLOCK SHUFFLE
• BUFFER KEY (used in the seed function, tells the algorithm how many keys to be
stored in the buffer).
• MODULO SWAP (which is used in the swap functions and tells the algorithm how big
or small can the bits swap process should be.) These variables can be set to be dynamic or
static (default = yes).
If set to dynamic, the algorithm will change its value as a function o f the password
entered. The minimum value is the default value entered for these parameters, and the
maximum is double the default value.
For example:
if ROUND = 2, then with the dynamic option ROUND could be a value between 2 and 4.
If ROUND was equal to 10, then it could be a value between 10 and 20.
The MODULO SWAP changes at each round.
All the other Dynamic variables change as block is encrypted.
By default we encrypt a file as one big block, so these values will change only once.
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CHAPTER IV

ALGORITHM APPLICATIONS
Two applications using the cryptography algorithm were first created for UNIX
(such as Linux, SunOS, Silicon Graphics, HPUX, etc.). The reasons for this choice were
because this system is the most used in the computer world. Also, because no graphical
user interface needed to be created, these applications could be created faster.
These applications have been created using the C language. They all use a library
which contains all the cryptography functions created for this project and only consist of
a user interface for the use of this library. Particular attention has been given to the error
check in these applications. Even if they are badly used, an understandable error message
is displayed. The following applications have been designed:
Encrypt/Decrypt file application:
This application is used to encrypt or decrypt a file. Some parameters have to be
set by the user: the password, the file to encrypt/decrypt, the destination file, the length of
the key, the encrypting power method, the round of the key generator used. The user can
even specify a custom crypt's block length and a custom shuffle's block length. There is
also an interactive mode where the application is prompting you for each parameter
required. This is a security enhancement if the user does not want someone doing a 'ps'
looking at his parameters
Secure chat, similar to the 'talk' UNIX command:
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Secure chat, similar to the 'talk' UNIX command;
This application can be used to have a secure conversation over a network
(Internet for instance). It uses a stream encryption method.
Key generator application:
This application is used to generate a key which will be stored in a file. Some
parameters have to be set by the user: the password or the random generation flag, the
destination file and the key length to be generated.
Login application similar to the UNIX system:
This application, is used when a user wants to log onto the system. Parameters
must be set by the user, such as his password and the location o f the password database
which contains his cipher password.
Password management application:
This application is quite similar to the key generator application but the key
generated is stored into a password database with the user login name. Some parameters
have to be set by the user such as the user name and his new password. If the user already
has a cipher password stored into the password database, he will have to re-type his old
password to be able to change it with the new one.
Hide/Extract engine application:
This application is used to hide a file in another file or to extract a previously
hidden file. The user can choose to hide a file at the beginning or at the end o f another
file. This is a completely separate part o f the cryptography called steganography. It will
be too long to create a strong steganography algorithm so this is why it is only a simple
algorithm (Added to the beginning or at the end o f a file). This part will be done, because
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even if the algorithm is simple, it could be useful. This is because, with this algorithm, if
the user wants to hide a file into a picture, video or sound file, it becomes invisible.

60

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CHAPTER V

ALGORITHM ANALYSIS
This section evaluates how the DCA successfully evades two powerful symmetric-key
block cipher cryptanalysis techniques: Linear Cryptanalysis [3] and Differential
Cryptanalysis [4].

5.1 Linear Cryptanalysis
Introduction
Linear Cryptanalysis tries to take advantage of high probability occurrences of
linear expressions involving plaintext bits, "ciphertext" bits (actually we use bits from the
2nd last round output), and subkey bits. It is a known plaintext attack: that is, it is
premised on the attacker having information on a set of plaintexts and the corresponding
ciphertexts. However, the attacker has no way to select which plaintexts (and
corresponding ciphertexts) are available. In many applications and scenarios it is
reasonable to assume that the attacker has knowledge of a random set of plaintexts and
the corresponding ciphertexts.
The idea is that, for each candidate subkey, we partially decrypt the cipher and check if
the relation holds. If the relation holds then increment its corresponding counter. At the
end, the candidate key that counts furthest from Vi is the most likely subkey.
The Piling up Lemma:
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Suppose X I, X 2,... are independent random variables from {0,1}. And
i = 1,2,... Hence,

Pr[A, = 0] = p , ,

P r [ A , = l ] - l - p , , 1 = 1,2,...
The independence o f Xi, Xj implies
Pr[A; = 0 , y —0] —PiPj
P r[A ,= Q ,A ^ = l] = p , ( l - p , )
P r [A ,= l,A ^ = 0 ] = ( l- p ,) p ^
P r [ A ,= l,A ^ = l] = ( l - p , ) ( l - p , )

Let

,,2

A , © • • •© X

denote the bias o f
k -

Then

I

k

= 2 0 ' ^ . ,
./ =I

■

Analysis o f DCA
Consider a function f that takes an 8-bit input (x) and an 8-bit subkey (k) as input
and produces an 8 bit output (y). We can write this as y = f(x, k) (mod 2). Imagine that
DCA had been designed in such a way that we could write the function f as a linear
combination o f x and k modulo 2. That is, what if the function f were designed as y = f(x,
k) = Mx + Dk (mod 2) where M and D are constant 8 x 8 matrices. The function f would
look like this:
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To do this we would only have to change the seeding and shuffling functions to
linear functions. All X O R’s are already linear functions. For example, and XOR can be
written like z = i(x, y):

^0

Xq

^0

(mod 2)
^3
%
So if the seeding and shuffling functions were linear equations we could easily
find a linear function y = f(x, k) (mod 2).
Assume the seeding and shuffling functions are linear function, which we can write as y
= g(x) = Ex where E is a constant 8x8 matrix;
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DCA has two rounds o f the function f (one for each o f two keys generated from the key
buffer K1 and K2). So if P is the plaintext and C is the ciphertext, then:
C = f(g(f(P ,K l)),K 2 )
=M xg(f(P ,K l)) + DxK2
=ExM xf(P, K l) + DxK2
=ExM x(M xP + D X K l) + DxK2
=ExM^xP + ExM xD xK l + DxK2 (mod 2)
Now define three new constant 8x8 matrices: R= ExM^, S= ExMxD, and T=D.
Even if we use independent subkeys for K l and K2, we cannot have a linear equation.
If in wcrst case, bit 0 o f the ciphertext is equal to bit 3 o f the plaintext XORed
with bit 4 o f the plaintext XORed with bit 5 o f the plaintext XORed with bit 0 o f K l, etc.
We would have similar equations for bits 1 through 7 o f the ciphertext. So for a known
ciphertext attack with one plaintext-ciphertext pair we would have 8 equations and 32
unknowns, which does not do much good.
But with 4 plaintext-ciphertext pairs you would have 32 equations and 32
unkowns. Using Gaussian elimination or Cramer’s rule it is easy to see that we could
solve this system with something on the order o f 32 calculations which is no good again.
Steps for performing linear cryptanalysis on DCA
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1] We need several good linear approximations for each linear function. They should
hold for more than 50% o f the possible inputs. Each equation is just XO R’s modulo 2
(equivalent to XORing them all together) to get an answer o f either 0 or 1.
2] We need about 100 plaintext/ciphertext pairs. They don’t have to be chosen plaintext,
this is a known plaintext attack.
3] Do step 4 for every possible subkey
4] For each plaintext/ciphertext pair that we have
4.1] Find Q, the output of the seeding.
4.2] Find S, the output o f shuffling.
4.3] See if each o f the linear approximations hold for S as input and Q as
output. We don’t really care what the first key is because any bit in the second key has a
50% chance o f being a 0 and not touching anything. If it were a 1 then it would change
one o f our S bits but we wouldn’t really care because our linear approximations are still
biased away from 50%. If S was chosen well then we would expect S and Q to show bias
with the linear approximations. If S is not anything like the input that was really used
when the ciphertext/plaintext pair was generated then w e’re just plugging in random bits
for S and Q and we would expect our linear approximations to hold about 50% o f the
time. The subkey that we guess that shows the highest deviation away from 50% is the
one most likely to be the real key. The level o f effort to break the cipher then comes from
the size o f the subkey and not the key size.
Linear cryptanalysis w on’t produce such dramatic results on DCA, because DCA
does not have many linear functions like S-F networks. The level o f effort to do linear
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cryptanalysis on DCA is still dependent on the size o f the subkey, but we need a lot of
plaintext/ciphertext pairs which makes it pretty much infeasible.

5.2 Differential Cryptanalysis
Introduction
Differential cryptanalysis exploits the high probability o f certain occurrences of
plaintext differences and differences into the last round o f the cipher. For example,
consider a system with input A =
to the system be

X

and

X '

input difference is given by

[ X \ X 2 ... X n ]

and output

with the corresponding outputs
X X = X

@ X '

[Fi

Y =

T

Y i ... Y n\.

and

Y ',

Let two inputs

respectively. The

where "©" represents a bit-wise exclusive-OR

o f the M-bit vectors and, hence,
A A = [AAi AA2.. . AAn]

The main difference from linear attack is that differential attack involves
comparing the XOR o f two inputs to the XOR o f the corresponding outputs. Differential
attack is a chosen-plaintext attack. We consider inputs x and x* having a specified XOR
value. We decrypt y and y* using all possible key and determine if their XOR has a
eertain value. Whenever it does, increment the corresponding counter. At the end, we
expect the largest one is the most likely subkey.
In order to use differential cryptanalysis on DCA the attacker would require large
amounts o f plaintexts. The number o f chosen plaintexts needed is dependent on the
ability o f XOR differences to propagate through a block cipher algorithm (and therefore
partly dependent on the number rounds) and the computational effort comes from the size
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o f the subkey used for each round. The search space o f differential cryptanalysis is the
subkey o f the last round and not the encryption key.
Steps for performing Differential Cryptanalysis on DCA
1] Choose an XOR difference for the plaintext pairs
Let us go ahead and use an XOR difference o f “ 10000000.” This means that each
o f our plaintext pairs will differ in only the first bit. For example “00000000” will be
paired with “ 10000000”, “00000001” will be paired with “ 10000001”, ..., “01100100”
will be paired with “ 11100100”, ..., and “01111111” will be paired with “ 11111111”.
2] Generate ciphertext pairs for some plaintext pairs
Differential cryptanalysis is a chosen plaintext attack, so we will need access to
the encryption equipment with the key installed. This doesn’t mean we can see the key,
though we ju st need to have access to the equipment.
Now we are going to encrypt 25 randomly chosen plaintext pairs from our
plaintext pairs above, for a total o f 50 encryptions. If our cipher had more rounds we
would have to do a lot more work.
W hen we do these 50 encryptions we get 25 ciphertext pairs, paired by the fact
that both ciphertexts in a pair came from one o f the plaintexts o f a plaintext pair.

Plaintext -> Ciphertext
One pair;
O llllO O l -> 11111001
11111001 -> 11 111 110

Another pair:
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01000100

->

10101100

11000100 - > 10011001
A third pair:
00000011 -> 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
10000011

->

10110111

etc.
3] Get 2 pieces o f information out o f each ciphertext pair
3.1] The first piece o f information we want out o f each ciphertext pair is the input
to seeding function.
3.2] The second piece o f information we need is not so trivial. We are going to
have to find out what the expected XOR difference that came out o f the shuffling
function.
4] Try all possible values for the subkey, which is extremely hard with larger keys.
For every subkey, what we have to do is recreate seeding, the 8-bit XOR after
seeding, and the shuffling for each ciphertext pair. The reason we have to use 25
ciphertext pairs instead o f just one is that there is a chance a false input might get lucky
and produce the right output, but this w on’t happen 25 times. The number 25 has nothing
to do with the key size or block size so it does not add to our measure o f complexity.
Each step has extremely large complexity due to which differential cryptanalysis
does not produce dramatic results against the DCA.
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5.3

Performance Analysis

Here are speed benchmarks for some of the most common cryptography
algorithms compared to the DCA. The test was run on a Pentium 4 2.1 GHz processor on
Windows XP professional platform. As shown, the DCA is considerably faster than its
peers.

Algorithm

Megabytes(2^20

Time Taken

MB/Seconds

bytes) Processed
DCA

256

3.841

66.649

MD5

1.02e+003

4.726

216.674

Ripemd-160

256

4.867

52.599

SHA-512

64

5.618

11.392

HMAC

1.02C+003

4J26

216.674

AES(256)

256

5J08

48.229

DES

128

5.998

21.340

RC4

512

4.517

113.350

Table 5.1 Speed Comparison of Cryptography Algorithms

Analysis of DCA, AES, 3DES and RC2
For the tests, the Microsoft Application Center Test (ACT) was used, which is
designed to stress test. Application Center Test can simulate a large group of users by
opening multiple connections to the server and rapidly sending HTTP requests. It also
allows us to build realistic test scenarios where we can call the same method with a
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allows us to build realistic test scenarios where we can call the same method with a
randomized set o f parameter values. This is an important feature, whereby users are not
expected to call the same method with the same parameter values over and over again.
The other useful feature is that Application Center Test records test results that provide
the most important information about the performance o f the Web application.
The algorithms were used to encrypt and decrypt data. Tests were performed with
a data size o f 4 KB, 100 KB, and 500 KB to see how the size o f data impacts
performance.

Figure 3.12a Plot o f Request per second against user load, data - 4 KB
Request/Second vs. User Load
Data size = 4 KB

RC2
3D ES
A ES
DCA

User Load

70

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Figure 3.12b Plot o f Response time against user load, data = 4 KB
Response Time vs. User Load

DCA
A ES
3D ES
RC2

U s e r L o ad

With small data, we find that the DCA is the fastest o f all the methods. A key
length o f 256 bits was chosen.
Next was the AES (Advanced Encryption standard). It has a variable block length
and key length, which may be chosen to be any o f 128, 192, or 256 bits. It also has a
variable number o f rounds to produce the cipher text, which depends on the key length
and the block length.
Next was the Triple DES (3DES) was invented to improve the security o f DES by
applying DES encryption three times using three different keys (note that encrypting data
three times with the same key does not offer any value). It is simply another mode of
DES, but it is highly secure and therefore slower in performance. It takes a 192-bit key,
which is broken into three 64-bit subkeys to be used in the encryption procedure. The
procedure is exactly like DES, but it is repeated three times, making it much more secure.
The data is encrypted with the first subkey, decrypted with the second subkey, and
encrypted again with the third subkey.
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RC2 turns out to be the slowest method when the data being encrypted is small. It
has an expensive computation up front to build a key-dependent table, which apparently
is high compared to the cost o f encrypting small data.

Figure 3.13a Plot o f Request per second against user load, data = 100 KB
Requests/Second vs. User Load
Data =100 KB

-A E S
3D E S
DCA
RC2

U se r L o ad

Figure 3.13b Plot o f Response time against user load, data = 1 0 0 KB
R e s p o n s e Tim e v s. U ser Load
Data Size = 100 KB
R e sp o n se T im e
1600

-R C 2
DCA

30ES

-AES

IN ^r L oad
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By increasing the size o f data being encrypted and decrypted, we see an entirely
different picture to what we saw in the previous test. RC2 is the fastest, followed by
DCA, which is around 20% faster than 3DES. Note that the expensive computation in
RC2 to build the key-dependent table is amortized over more data. AES in this case is the
slowest; 25% slower than 3DES. Note that we are using a 256-bit key for AES
encryption, which makes it stronger than the other methods (though there has been some
press about possible attacks against AES, which might be better than brute force attack)
and for the same reason the slowest o f all. Similarly, we used a 192-bit key in case of
3DES. Using a same-length key does not necessarily mean that different algorithms will
have the same strength. Different algorithms have different characteristics and hence they
may not provide the same strength.
There is always a tradeoff between security and performance. We need to
understand the value o f sensitive data, the deployment cost, and usability/performance
tradeoffs before you can begin choosing a right algorithm for securing data. If the cost o f
data that is being protected is high, then we must consider taking a performance hit to
secure the data. Otherwise, we may be better off using a less secure algorithm.
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Figure 3.14a Plot o f Request per second against user load, data = 500 KB

R e q u e s t/S e c o n d v s. U ser Load
D ata = 500 KB

-* -A E S
3DES
DCA
< RC4

10

15
U s e r L o ad

Figure 3.14b Plot o f Response time against user load, data = 500 KB
R e s p o n s e Tim e v s. U se r Load
D ata = 500 KB

E 2000

RC2
DCA
3DES
AES

1000

U s e r L o ad

With the increasing size o f data being encrypted and decrypted, we see the same
trend prevailed in this test too.
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CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION
The main problem in this algorithm concept was that it was necessary to always have in
mind the following words: security, efficiency and portability. Everything has been done
to respect these keywords.
To conclude, here is a summary of the algorithm specifications originally. All
initial design goals were met successfully.
- Private Key algorithm
- The source code can be public without making the algorithm weak
- Dynamic Algorithm
- Pseudo Random numbers generated using a Linear Feedback Shift Register and ISAAC
Algorithm
- Direct disk access or Memory buffer method in order to run on low specification
computer and Palm devices
- Stream encryption option
- Block encryption option
- Key generator: Bits manipulations, bilateral bits swapping and logical bits operations,
random generator.
- Encrypt file (using the key generator): Variable length cipher block algorithm.
- 5 Power levels: Seed, Random Seed, Shuffle, Seed + Shuffle, Random Seed + Shuffle.

75

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

- Key length unlimited (as big as your integer type can take).
The algorithm was successfully able to evade two o f the most powerful
cryptanalysis techniques: Linear and Differential Cryptanalysis.
As proposed, the following applications we designed too, highlighting some of
the applications o f the cryptography suite:
•

Encrypt/Decrypt file application

•

Secure chat

•

Key generator application

•

Login application

•

Password management application

•

Hide/Extract engine.
The project applications were tested on many different operating systems (OS):

Windows 9x, Windows NT, UNIX (Linux, HPUX, Silicon Graphics, and Solaris).
Because each operating system is different (memory management, permission rights,
variable management, etc) these tests were very important. For example, a problem
regarding the way the password was stored in the memory occurred once. No errors were
generated when the application was running on Linux, but on the Silicon graphics OS an
error was generated. This was because on Linux the memory management is less strict
than on Silicon Graphics (or at least at the time on the Linux OS there were not as many
users as there were on SGI). Therefore, sometimes the application worked fine on the
Silicon graphics and Windows but not on the SunOS because these first two OS were
more compliant in certain areas. These tests helped in eliminating several bugs.
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The algorithm has reached its maturity after several iterations and careful
cryptanalysis. Future work includes designing attack cased against the algorithm.
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